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Potential Tax Pitfalls of Professional
Corporations and Associations
In 1969 after a long legal struggle over recognition of professional
corporations, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that it
was "conceding that organizations of doctors, lawyers and other pro-
fessional people organized under state professional acts will, generally,
be treated as corporations for tax purposes."' Today every jurisdiction
that had not already done so has passed a professional association or
corporation statute making the corporate form available to its profes-
sionals.2
The advantages of the professional corporation3 over partnerships
and sole proprietorships are by now well known. The availability of
qualified pension and profit sharing plans4 makes possible greater tax
exempt contributions toward the professional's retirement than are avail-
able under the Keogh Plan.' Up to 50,000 dollars of group term life
insurance coverage for each employee is a deductible cost to the corpora-
tion,' which can also provide up to 5000 dollars in tax-free death bene-
1. T.I.R. 1019 (August 8, 1969), reprinted, 6 P-H 1969 FED. TUMs 55,334.
In addition, see Rev. Rul. 70-455, 1970-2 Cum. BuLL. 297; Rev. Rul. 70-101, 1970-1
CuM. BuLL. 278.
2. H. Jones, INTRODUCnON to PROFESSIONAL CoRpoRATioNs-1972, at 10 (PLI
Tax Law and Practice Handbook No. 46, H. Jones ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as PLI
HANDnOOK]. The North Carolina Professional Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55B-1 to -15 (Supp. 1971), became effective on January 1, 1970.
3. For convenience, the term "professional corporation" will be used to refer
both to professional corporations and to professional associations organized under state
professional acts.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 402-04. For a discussion of qualified pension and
profit sharing plans, which allow for tax free accumulation and compounding of em-
ployer contributions to employee retirement plans, see B. EATON, PROFESSIONAL CoR-
PORATIONS AND AssocuTioNs § 2.10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as B. EAToN]. The em-
ployee is taxed under such plans only when he retires and begins to receive payments,
at which time he ordinarily will fall into a lower tax bracket.
5. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792,
76 Stat. 809, (codified in scattered sections of CODE) extended limited pension and
profit sharing benefits to the self employed. See INT. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954 §§ 401(a),
(c)-(e); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-10 to -13 (1963). For other advantages of professional
incorporation over utilization of the Keogh Plan see Reich, Alternatives To The Profes-
sional Corporation; Partnership; Association Taxable as a Corporation; Advantages and
Disadvantages of Each; Present Status of the Kintner Regulations, N.Y.U. 28TH INsr.
ON FmD. TAX. 1173, 1208-11 (1969). One example is that distributions of employer
contributions from a qualified plan due to the death of the employee to a beneficiary
other than the employee's estate are free from federal estate tax (this exemption is not
available under the Keogh Plan). INT. REv. ConE OF 1954 § 2039(c).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 79, 162(a)(1).
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fits.7  Other fringe benefits such as accident, health, and sickness plans
can be paid for with deductible corporate dollars instead of being funded
by the professional with his own after-tax dollars." The corporation
can make deductible payments of up to one hundred dollars a week to a
sick or disabled employee or reimburse him for medical or dental ex-
penses without tax consequence to the employee.' Workmen's compen-
sation can be elected under state statute.'0 Non-qualified deferred com-
pensation plans by which the employee receives compensation after
retirement (when he is in a lower tax bracket) based on an agreement
not to compete and to hold himself available for consultation can be ar-
ranged.'-
The professional corporation enjoys favorable corporate tax rates"
(although it may choose to pay out all of its income in salaries and con-
tributions to qualified plans) and a maximum tax rate of 7.2 percent
on dividends received from other corporations.' 3 Selection of a new
fiscal year is available to the professional corporation, but an existing
partnership cannot normally change its taxable year without securing
the prior approval of the Commissioner. 14  In most states the profes-
sional's liability with respect to the activities of his associates is more
limited than in a partnership context.'5 The continuity of life afforded
by the corporation often facilitates the transition that occurs upon a pro-
fessional's death or retirement, as does the greater transferability of cor-
porate shares.' 6 Finally, centralized management may provide for a
more efficient operation.'
7
All of these benefits of incorporation and the disadvantages' to be
7. Id. § 101(b).
8. Id. § 106; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958).
9. INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954 § 105. A self-administered medical expense plan
that provides for reimbursement of all employee medical expenses by the corporation
at the end of the year as a tax-free bonus is discussed in Wright, Professional Corpo-
rations-Concepts, Considerations, and Practical Implementation, 7 CAL.M W.L. REv.
1, 44-46 (1970).
10. Rosen, Professional Corporations-Advantages and Disadvantages, 6 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 661, 667 (1971).
11. Id. at 668-69.
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 11(b).
13. The corporation receives an 85 % deduction for dividends received from other
corporations. Id. § 243. At a corporate tax rate of 48% this produces a tax of
7.2%.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(b)(1) (1960); Ray, Factors that go into decision of
whether to operate as a professional corporation, 34 J. TAX. 130, 131 (1971).
15. Ray, supra note 14, at 131-32.
16. Id. at 132.
17. Reich, supra note 5, at 1212-13.
18. Non-tax factors which may weigh against incorporation include: loss of
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set off against them have been discussed at length by legal writers. This
comment will focus primarily on areas in which the professional cor-
poration is potentially vulnerable to traditional corporate attacks by
the Commissioner in the aftermath of his concession of corporate tax
status.
HISTORY
The events leading up to the Commissioner's concession are re-
markable. Upon the inception of the income tax, "the general thrust
of the Regulations, especially under the 1939 Code, was to sweep as
many taxpayers as possible into the corporate category"'" because the
corporate tax rates at that time were higher than individual rates. In
1935 in Morrissey v. Commissioner0 the United States Supreme Court,
at the urging of the Commissioner, held a trust to be an "association"
taxable as a corporation because it "resembled" a true corporation hav-
ing the characteristics of continuity of life, centralized management,
limited liability, and free transferability of interests. A year later in
Pelton v. Commissioner2 the Seventh Circuit applied the Commissioner's
reasoning to a professional organization when it held that a trust organ-
ized to operate a medical clinic was taxable as a corporation by virtue
of its "resemblance to a corporation" under Morrissey.
After World War II when the tax advantages of the corporate
form began to outweigh the disadvantages, the Commissioner came to
rue his position in these earlier cases as taxpayers began to turn the
decisions to their advantage. In 1954 in United States v. Kintner 2 the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that state law disallowing incorporation of pro-
fessionals did not govern an organization's status for federal tax pur-
poses and held that an unincorporated association of doctors having
individual investment freedom over funds earmarked for pension or profit sharing plans
(or corporate investments); disinterests in expanded retirement benefits due to a desire
never to retire or the possibility of death before retirement; the natural disinclination
to change a long standing mode of operation; loss of status by senior partners; inability
by one or more partners to spare the extra dollars required to fund higher contributions
to a corporate qualified plan; and potentially greater governmental regulation of corpo-
rations as opposed to partnerships. Ray, supra note 14, at 132-33. Adverse tax con-
siderations include: slightly higher Social Security taxes (due to combined corporate
and individual taxes); somewhat greater state and federal unemployment taxes; double
taxation if corporate income is distributed in a form which does not allow deduction by
the corporation; and state franchise taxes. Id. at 131. Finally, a partnership does not
face the corporate tax pitfalls discussed infra.
19. B. EATON § 5.02, at 5-4.
20. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
21. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
22. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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substantial corporate characteristics was entitled to taxation as a cor-
poration and to concomitant tax benefits.2"
Faced with this setback, the Commissioner reversed his earlier po-
sition and in 1960 issued what came to be known as the "Kintner Regu-
lations.' 24  These Regulations continued the Morrissey tests but ex-
panded and toughened the degree of "resemblance" required.25 Further-
more, the new regulations placed a new impediment in the way of pro-
fessional incorporation by referring to state law to determine the charac-
terization of the organization. "The effect of this ruling was to prevent
professional groups, operating in most states under the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, from providing the necessary corporate characteristics. ' 20  Un-
deterred, professionals promptly obtained state legislation permitting
professionals to incorporate or to form associations "resembling" cor-
porations.
In response to this development the Commissioner again changed
course, taking the position that a state law "label" was no longer
determinative, and issued regulations in 196528 so narrowly circum-
scribing qualifications for corporate tax status as to insure that profes-
sional organizations, proclaimed as "inherently different," would al-
most never be taxed as corporations. 29 This development returned the
controversy to the courts"°, which uniformly upheld corporate tax status
for professional corporations.8 1 Finally, the Commissioner in 1969
conceded that professional organizations incorporated under state law
would generally be treated as corporations for tax purposes.1
2
This announcement by the IRS for the most part ended the bat-
tie over the proper classification of the professional corporation or asso-
23. The Kintner decision was followed by two other cases involving corporate
taxation of "associations" of doctors notwithstanding state law prohibiting incorpora-
tion of professionals. Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964);
Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
24. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 CuM. BuLL. 409.
25. 'The 1960 Regulations apparently were designed to make it as difficult as
possible for professional groups, which formed unincorporated organizations to practice
their professions, to obtain treatment of such associations as corporations for federal
income tax purposes." United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 169 (10th Cir. 1969).
26. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 383, 387 (1965).
27. By 1965 thirty-one states had passed such legislation with bills pending in many
other jurisdictions. Id. at 387-88.
28. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -2 (1965).
29. B. EATON § 5.08, at 5-19.
30. Reich, supra note 5, at 1185-91.
31. Comment, Tax and Corporate Aspects of Professional Incorporation in North
Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 573, 576 (1970).
32. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
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ciation for tax purposes but did not mark the end of the Treasury
Department's antipathy to the corporation as a mode of professional
organization. K. Martin Worthy, at the time Chief Counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service and Associate General Counsel of the Treasury,
commented:
From a purely personal perspective, I find it quite unfortunate
that the Code's disparate tax treatment of corporate employees
and professionals, taken together with court decisions on classifica-
tion and the Treasury's 1960 "Kintner" Regulations, have led to
state legislation permitting incorporation and, thus, to the formation
of incorporated organizations by professionals. The potential, if
not actual, erosion of the traditional stringent professional standards
and liabilities on the part of those who form such entities is, in my
opinion, a highly undesirable byproduct of this problem and its
eventual resolution. The intervention of a legal entity between
patient and doctor or between client and lawyer would not appear
to serve social or public purposes.
38
It would be unfortunate if this sentiment were translated into a
corporate double standard resulting in closer scrutiny for the profes-
sional corporation in traditional areas of corporate vulnerability that
provide the Commissioner with formidable avenues of attack. A few
of these traditional corporate tax pitfalls that the Commissioner could
apply with less than an even hand include disregard of the corporate
form, reasonableness of compensation, disguised dividends, assumption
of liabilities under section 351 exchanges, allocation of income under
section 482, accumulations of earnings, and personal holding company
penalties. These pitfalls will be examined in turn in the succeeding sec-
tions of this comment.
DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FORM
Indeed, even after the Commissioner's concession, classification of
a professional group incorporated pursuant to state law as a corporation
for tax purposes is not automatic. In Jerome J. Roubik85 the Tax
Court found that a professional corporation employing four radiologists
existed as a "mere set of bookkeeping entries and bank accounts"36 and
not as a meaningful business entity. The corporation "did not own any
33. Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel outlines what lies ahead for professional corpora-
tions, 32 J. TAx. 88 (1970).
34. Cf. Jones, Is There A Dividend Requirement for Professional Corporations?,
in PLI HANDBOOK 121, 130.
35. 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
36. Id. at 379.
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equipment, incur any debts for rent, office or medical supplies or serv-
ices or for salaries, except for salaries of the [radiologists]. '37  The radiol-
ogists were found not to be bona fide employees of the professional
corporation because they had not surrendered control over their personal
services to the corporation. Consequently, the court held that the
corporation should be ignored and the income taxed directly to the in-
dividual radiologists who earned it.38
Revenue Ruling 70-101,3 9 citing Roubik, qualified the recognition
of a corporation organized under state law by adding the requirement
that the organization be "both organized and operated as a corportion
to be classified as such."
The disregard of the corporate form in Roubik was flagrant, and
the problems it raises can be avoided by meticulous detail to corporate
formalities, actual assumption of control by the professional corpora-
tion over the personal services of its employees, and operation as a real
corporation in substance as well as form. 40  "The lesson learned from
Roubik is simple: the corporation must, in all respects, act like a cor-
poration." 41
SECTION 357 (c): TRAP FOR THE UNWARY ON SECTION 351 EXCHANGES
Section 351 represents a congressional policy of facilitating move-
ment into the corporate form by partnerships and sole proprietorships.
Under this section no gain is recognized if property is transferred to a
corporation in exchange for qualifying corporate stock or securities pro-
vided that the transferors of the property are in contro 42 of the corpora-
tion immediately after the exchange. Because of the availability of
this tax-free exchange, section 351 is an attractive vehicle for profes-
sional incorporation.43
However, if the corporation assumes liabilities of the transferror
37. Id.
38. This case is discussed in Note, The Latest Chapter in the Continuing Contro-
versy Regarding Professional Service Corporations-The Roubik Case, 19 U. KAN. L.
REV. 348 (1971).
39. 1970-1 CuM. BuLL. 278.
40. B. EATON § 6.02, at 6-9.
41. Zonana, Professional Corporations, in PLI HANDBOOK 161, 206.
42. "Control" for such transfers is defined by CODE section 368(c) to mean pos-
session of "at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote" and at least 80% of the shares of each class of stock outstanding.
43. § 351 is not an optional provision but, if desired, its application can usually
be avoided by failing to meet its qualifications, such as the control requirement. If
the transferors would recognize a loss on a taxable sale or exchange of the property, it
may be advantageous to avoid section 351 and take the loss deduction.
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or if the property transferred to the corporation is subject to liabilities,
as is often the case, problems can arise under section 357(c). If the
liabilities assumed plus the amount of liabilities to which the property
is subject exceed the adjusted basis of the property transferred, then
gain is recognized to the transferror in the amount of the difference.
44
Apparently the original purpose of section 357 (c) was to prevent
abuses that arose under the predecessor of section 351 when taxpayers
mortgaged property heavily prior to transferring it to a controlled cor-
poration.4 1 The taxpayer had present non-taxable possession of the
loan money and was free of the obligation to repay the loan.46 The only
adverse consequence was that the taxpayer's basis in the stocks or securi-
ties received from the corporation was reduced by the amount of lia-
bilities assumed by the corporation 47 (but only to zero).48
Such reduction in basis would cause the amount to be recognized
eventually to the taxpayer if the corporate paper were later sold or ex-
changed. However, the stock or securities might be held until the tax-
payer died whereupon it would receive a stepped-up basis equal to its
fair market value at that time.49 In that event gain would never be
recognized to the taxpayer on the transaction.
Although section 357 (c) may have been designed to serve a good
purpose, its application with certain basis rules presents a hazardous
trap for the unwary. 50  Suppose that a sole practitioner, Mr. A., de-
cides to form a professional corporation under the tax-free provisions
of section 351. Assume that Mr. A is a cash basis taxpayer and, to
emphasize the point, shows only the following two items on his balance
sheet:
44. Taxpayers tried to equalize the difference between adjusted basis of property
and liabilities by giving the corporation a personal promissory note as a capital contri-
bution. However, Rev. Rul. 68-629, 1968-2 CUM. BUL. 154, stipulates that the ad-
justed basis of such a note is zero since under § 1012 the basis of property is its cost
and the taxpayer incurred no costs in making the note.
45. Comment, Section 357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv.
1154, 1156-57 (1967).
46. For a case in which the taxpayer enjoyed a tax-free gain of $130,000 in this
way see Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
For an article on mortgaging property for more than cost written by one of the tax-
payer's attorneys in Woodsam see Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property for
More Than Cost Without Personal Liability, 6 TAx L. R v. 319 (1951).
47. See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
48. As of 1967, only the Ninth Circuit had allowed a negative basis. Comment,
115 U. PA. L. Rlv., supra note 45, at 1161.
49. INT. RIV. CODE OF 1954 § 1014.
50. Accounts payable may represent a de minimis amount for some professional
groups, e.g., law firms. Consequently, assumption of these liabilities may pose less of
a problem.
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Assets Fair Market Value
Accounts Receivable5' $100,000
Liabilities
Accounts Payable $ 50,000
The following tax consequences will result if Mr. A transfers these
items under section 351 to the newly formed professional corporation:
1. Mr. A will recognize gain on the transfer in the amount
of 50,000 dollars notwithstanding the fact the transfer qualifies
under section 351.
2. Mr. A's basis in the stock 52 he receives in exchange for
the property will be zero. If he later sells his stock for 50,000
dollars, he would be taxed on the full amount again (at capital gain
rates).
3. Mr. A's entire gain on the transaction will be taxed as
ordinary income.
4. The corporation's basis in the property it receives will be
50,000 dollars.
5. Collection of the receivables will result in ordinary income
to the corporation in the amount of 50,000 dollars.
6. As a cash basis taxpayer, Mr. A cannot deduct the ac-
counts payable because at the time of transfer they have not been
paid. Furthermore, when the corporation makes payment it
probably will not be able to take expense deductions.
7. If Mr. A had formed the corporation with another prac-
titioner and the aggregate basis of all property transferred exceeded
aggregate liabilities, Mr. A would still be taxed on 50,000 dollars.
8. If Mr. A had been an accrual taxpayer, no gain would be
recognized to him on the transfer,53 his basis in the corporate stock
would be 50,000 dollars, the corporation's basis in the property
received would be 100,000 dollars, and the collection of the re-
ceivables would result in no income to the corporation.
These consequences will be explored in greater detail below.
1. Recognition of Gain. The recognition of 50,000 dollars of
gain to Mr. A is dictated by the leading case in this area, Peter Raich.5
The facts in Raich are similar to Mr. A's situation (but not as simple,
of course), and the results are the same.
51. Accounts receivable have a zero basis in the hands of a cash basis taxpayer.
P.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 1940).
52. For convenience, assume that Mr. A received no securities or non-qualifying
property ("boot") from the corporation. See note 56 infra.
53. Mr. A would have accrued income from the receivables ($100,000) earlier,
however, from which the payables ($50,000) would be deducted, netting $50,000 in
taxable income.
54. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
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The key point in the recognition of gain in Raich and for Mr. A
is the fact that accounts receivable in the hands of a cash basis tax-
payer have a zero basis.55 Consequently, since all Mr. A's assets are
accounts receivable, the basis in his hands of the assets transferred to
the corporation is zero.
The other crucial determination made by Raich, but rejected by
the Second Circuit in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,5" is that accounts
payable transferred to a corporation are considered to be liabilities as-
sumed by the corporation for purposes of section 357 (c).
When section 357(c) is applied in light of these rules, Mr. A recog-
nizes 50,000 dollars of gain as follows:
Liabilities assumed (accounts payable) $50,000
Minus basis of property transferred
(accounts receivable with basis of zero) -0-
Gain recognized to section 351 transferor $50,000
2. Transferor's Zero Basis in Stock. The second tax implication
arising from Raich is that Mr. A's basis in the stock he receives from the
corporation will also be zero, notwithstanding the fact that he is taxed
on the transfer.
Section 358 governs the basis of the corporate paper received by
the transferor in a section 351 transfer. The formula of section 358 as
applied to Mr. A's situation would be as follows:5 7
(a) The basis of Mr. A's stock is the same as the basis of
the property he transferred to the corporation
(b) Increased by the gain recognized to Mr. A on the
transaction and
(c) Decreased by the liabilities assumed by the corporation.
Thus the computation would be:
Substitute basis of property
(Accounts receivable) -0-




Basis in Stock -0-
55. See note 51 supra.
56. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
57. For purposes of this discussion, "boot" provisions of § 358 are ignored.
("Boot" under § 351 is property received by the transferor other than stock or securi-
ties of the corporation, e.g. cash or short-term notes. If the transferor receives "boot,"
he is taxed on the lesser of gain inherent in the transaction or the fair market value
of the "boot." See INT. REv. CODE op 1954 § 351(b).)
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Again this result is dictated by the holding in Raich that accounts
payable are liabilities assumed by the corporation. 8 Revenue Ruling
69-44211 made it clear that the Commissioner intends to apply section
357 (c) to situations similar to Raich.
3. Ordinary Gain. Section 357(c) expressly provides that gain
resulting from an excess of liabilities over basis of property transferred
will be taxed as capital gains or ordinary income depending on the na-
ture of the assets transferred. Since section 1221, which defines capi-
tal assets, specifically excludes accounts receivable, 0° it is clear that
capital gains treatment is not available for Mr. A's gain and that it must
be taxed at ordinary income rates.
Ordinary income rates for section 357(c) gains can also result
from other Code provisions. For example, section 1239 taxes gain on
a sale or exchange of depreciable property between an individual and
an eighty percent controlled corporation at ordinary income rates. With
respect to a transfer of property depreciable in the hands of the corpora-
tion, Revenue Ruling 60-30261 states: "[G]ain recognized to the trans-
feror under the provisions of section 357 (c) of the Code will . . . be
treated as ordinary income under section 1239 of the Code."
4. Corpdration's Basis. Under section 362(a), the corporation's
basis in the property transferred to it is "the same as it would be in the
hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recognized to
the transferor."62 Since Mr. A's basis is zero and the gain recognized
is 50,000 dollars, the corporation's basis in the property is 50,000 dol-
lars.
5. Collection of Receivables. The corporation will collect 100,-
000 dollars in receivables, which is 50,000 dollars in excess of the cor-
poration's basis. Consequently, ordinary gain in the amount of 50,000
58. In reading § 357(c) literally notwithstanding its harsh consequences, the Tax
Court in Ralch said:
In applying section 357(c) to the facts herein, we are not unmindful that
the result reached may conflict with the well established intent of Congress to
foster tax-free business reorganizations. However, in the absence of a clearly
expressed congressional intent, we decline to adopt a construction of section
357(c) which is supported neither by its language nor its legislative history.
46 T.C. at 611.
59. 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 53.
60. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1221(4).
61. 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 223. Similar treatment can result under §§ 1245 and
1250.
62. In Raich the court indicated in dictum that the corporation's basis was zero
overlooking the fact that the transferor's gain is added to the corporation's basis. See
Burke & Chisholm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free Incorporations, 25 TAx
L. REv. 211, 229 n.62 (1970).
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dollars will be recognized to the corporation. 3
6. Non-Deductibility of Accounts Payable. A cash basis tax-
payer cannot deduct accounts payable until they are actually paid. Con-
sequently, Mr. A cannot deduct the 50,000 dollars because he will never
pay the liabilities.
Unfortunately, if a corporation assumes cash basis accounts pay-
able of a cash basis transferor, it is generally understood that the corpora-
tion cannot receive a deduction for payment of those items because the
assumed liabilities are part of its acquisition cost for the assets. 4 Mr.
Worthy, however, has suggested: "It may be that such a result would be
inappropriate in view of the basic policy of section 351 of treating the
new corporation as a continuation of the previous business. ' 65, One way
to circumvent the accounts payable problem is to leave the accounts
payable in the hands of the transferor and to hold back enough cash
and accounts receivables to pay the accounts payable as they come due.
The Commissioner allows this procedure. 6
7. Individual Application of Section 357(c). If Mr. A had formed
a corporation with another practitioner who contributed unencumbered
assets the basis of which more than offset Mr. A's accounts payable,
Mr. A would still have been taxed on the full 50,000 dollars. Revenue
Ruling 66-14267 states:
In an exchange to which section 351 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 is applicable, the provisions of section 357(c) of
the Code apply separately to each transferor so that the gain to
each transferor is the excess of the sum of the amount of his liabili-
ties assumed over the adjusted basis of all property transferred by
him pursuant to the exchange determined without regard to the
adjusted basis and liabilities of any other transferors.
Of course, if a single transferor transfers several properties to the cor-
63. § 1221, of course, bars capital gains treatment here as well.
64. Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946); B.
BrrrKR & J. EusvscE, FEDERLA INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORATiONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
1 3.12, at 3-43 (3d ed. 1971); Burke & Chisholm, supra note 61, at 230; Paul & Kalish,
Transition from a Partnership to a Corporation, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 639,
656-58 (1960); Tritt & Spencer, Current Tax Problems in Incorporation of a Going
Business, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX. INST. 71.
65. Worthy, supra note 33, at 91.
66. Mr. Worthy states: "In view of the potential problem presented by Section
357(c), it has been the practice of the Service not to refuse to rule favorably under
Section 351 merely because the transferor retains accounts payable, so long as he also
retains sufficient receivables to cover them. Id. at 91 n.11.
67. 1966-1 CuM. BuLL. 66; see B. Brrrrmm & J. EusTICE, supra note 63, 3.07,
at 3-28 n.41.
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poration, the aggregate liabilities are compared to the aggregate adjusted
basis of the properties.
8. Accrual Basis Taxpayer. Accounts receivable are taken into
income by a taxpayer on the accrual method when the right to receive
them comes into being. 68  Accounts payable are deductible when the
taxpayer becomes legally responsible for the liability.6 Thus an accrual
method taxpayer will have already taken the 100,000 dollars represented
by the accounts receivable into income and have been allowed a deduc-
tion for the 50,000 dollars in accounts payable before the transfer.70
The net effect is that he has already paid taxes on 50,000 dollars in
ordinary income. By being taken into income, the accounts receivable
acquired a cost basis of 100,000 dollars. Under section 362(a) the
basis to the corporation is the same as in the hands of the transferor,
i.e., 100,000 dollars. Consequently, when the corporation collects the
100,000 dollars, no gain is realized.
A recent Second Circuit case, Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,71
sought to ameliorate some of the harsh effects of section 357(c) for a
cash basis taxpayer, but in the process the court may have opened the
door to abuses similar to those that preceded the passage of section
357 (c). The difference in tax treatment between cash basis and accural
method taxpayers in section 351 transfers was one of the arguments
seized upon by the Second Circuit in Bonglovanni in holding that ac-
counts payable of cash basis taxpayers are not "liabilities for purposes of
determining gain under section 357(c). The court drew a distinction be-
tween "strictly accounting" liabilities (referring to accounts payable) and
"tax liabilities," by which it meant "liens in excess of tax costs, partic-
ularly mortgages encumbering property transferred in a Section 351
transaction. '72  The court went on to say: "We see no reason why
different consequences under Section 357(c) should arise from identi-
cal circumstances because of the wholly unrelated selection of an ac-
counting method.1
73
What the court ignored was the fact that different consequences
with respect to gain recognition to the transferor should arise on a sec-
tion 351 transfer because the accrual basis taxpayer has already been
68. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934).
69. Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944).
70. Any reserve for bad debts is ignored for purposes of this discussion.
71. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
72. Id. at 924.
73. Id. at 925.
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taxed on accounts receivable at ordinary income rates at time prior to
the transfer, but the cash basis taxpayer has not.
74
The advantages conferred on the accrual taxpayer really lie in
the basis rules, which not only eliminate a second tax upon the accrual
basis transferor when he sells his stock received from the corporation 75
but also allow the corporation to collect the receivables transferred with-
out realizing gain.
The following chart compares gain recognized to the transferor
and the corporation as well as the basis consequences under four sep-
arate approaches to section 357 (c) problems.
AssuMPTIONS: Accounts receivables = $100,000 (zero basis for cash
method taxpayer) Accounts payable = $50,000
TAX CONSEQUENCES VARIABLES
A B C D
Gain recognized




of receivables.tt $50,000 $50,000 $100,000 0
Gain recognized
to transferor if




rates). $50,000 $50,000 $50,000 0
Transferor's
basis in
stock received. 0 0 0 $50,000
Corporation's
basis in property
received. $50,000 0 0 $100,000
COLUMN A: Accounts receivable and accounts payable transferred to cor-
poration in Raich jurisdiction.
COLUMN B: Accounts payable and equivalent amount of receivables re-
tained by transferor (i.e., $50,000 in receivables transferred
to corporation).
COLUMN C: Accounts receivable and accounts payable transferred to cor-
poration in Bongiovanni jurisdiction.
74. See note 53 supra.
75. The only way the cash basis transferor can avoid a second tax is to hold
the shares until death in order to receive a stepped up basis under § 1014.
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COLUMN D: Accounts receivable and accounts payable transferred by
accrual method taxpayer.
t Receivables offset by payables when accrued (before the transfer).
ft In all four situations the corporation will have the liability for payment of
the $50,000 in accounts payable. It is uncertain whether the corporation will receive
a deduction for such payment. 76
The chart shows that the court in Bongiovanni merely transferred
the tax burden from the transferor to the corporation. When the cor-
poration collects the accounts receivable it will be taxed on the full
100,000 dollars since its basis in the receivables is zero. This figure
may be compared to a 50,000 dollar basis to the corporation in a jur-
isdiction that follows Raich in which the transferor is taxed on 50,000
dollars77 giving the corporation a basis boost in that amount.7 8  This
transfer of the tax burden will almost certainly result in a lowered
revenue yield in light of favorable corporate tax rates and deductions
available to corporations but not to individuals or partnerships."0
Furthermore, the Second Circuit reopened the door that section
357 (c) had sought to close. Under Bongiovanni the cash basis taxpayer
never suffers a tax at ordinary gains rates. The only tax he will bear
will be capital gain when (and if) he sells or exchanges his stock in the
corporation. If the taxpayer holds the corporate stock until death, he
will never be taxed because of section 1014, thus duplicating the situa-
tion before section 357(c). Prior to the enactment of section 357(c),
taxpayers heavily mortgaged their property before making a transfer
under section 351. In the aftermath of Bongiovanni, taxpayers in that
jurisdiction will simply run up their accounts payable prior to such a
transfer.
Section 357(c) as it stands today does result in unequal treatment
for the cash basis taxpayer and steps should be taken by the commissioner
or Congress to correct this inequity. However, the approach taken in
Bongiovanni does not equalize the tax consequences of a section 357
transfer for an accrual and a cash basis taxpayer (see chart). Further-
more, abuses may result from the decision.
One suggested solution to the problem which deserves consideration
is to require the cash basis taxpayer to "accrue" all accounts receivable
and accounts payable before a section 351 transfer.8 0 This would result
76. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
79. See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra.
80. Burke & Chisholm, supra note 61, at 232.
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in identical treatment for cash basis and accrual taxpayers. The draw-
back of this approach is that prospective recognition of gain on the
part of a cash basis taxpayer resulting from accrual of accounts receiv-
able might discourage movement into the corporate form thus clashing
with the Congressional intent underlying section 351. (Of course, the
accrual taxpayer has already recognized such gain.)
In summary, assumption of liabilities in a section 351 transfer is
fraught with hazards for the professional corporation. Probably the
best course of action is to withhold accounts payable and enough cash
and receivables to pay off accounts payable as they come due. Profes-
sionals in the Second Circuit, however, may want to avail themselves of
the advantage offered by the decision in Bongiovanni.
REASONABLENESS OF COMPENSATION AND DISGUISED DIVIDENDS
Another avenue of attack available to the Commissioner aims not
at the existence of the professional corporation but at the compensation
received by its professional employees. A corporation may deduct all
ordinary and necessary expenses including "a reasonable allowance for
salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered.""1
Treasury regulations provide: "The test of deductibility in the case of
compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are in fact
payments purely for services."' 2
It had generally been thought that so long as a professional's com-
pensation was no greater after incorporation than before, it could not
be attacked as unreasonable.8 3 Likewise, it was felt that professional
salaries based on the firm's billings represented reasonable compensa-
tion for their services.84 However, since salary payments must be made
"purely" for services actually rendered, a danger exists that the IRS
may contend that part of the income paid to the professional is
attributable to his proprietary interest and represents a return on capital
including, perhaps, a return on goodwill.
The conclusion is usually inescapable that not all of a partner's
distributive share of income is attributable to his professional or
managerial services. A substantial part of it represents his pro-
prietary interest, and it is difficult to justify withdrawing this part,
81. CODE § 162(a) (1).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a) (1960) (emphasis added).
83. Jones, supra note 34, at 123, citing Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau v. Com-
missioner, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
84. McClung Hosp., Inc., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1960).
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whatever it may be, as compensation when the group is incorpo-
rated.85
The argument is that, even if compensation is reasonable, part of the
income flowing to the professional employee who is also a shareholder
is in fact a "disguised dividend." This approach by the IRS has yet to
be tested in the professional corporation context. However, in Charles
McCandless Tile Service v. United States,"' the Court of Claims, while
recognizing the reasonableness of the compensation paid, noted that the
corporation had never paid a dividend and held that a portion of the
salaries paid was not deductible. The court found that fifteen percent
of net profits represented a return of capital:
Even a payment deemed reasonable, however, is not deductible
to the extent that it is in reality a distribution of corporate earnings
and not compensation for services rendered. . . . We think it clear
that any return on equity capital is so conspicuous by its absence as
to indicate, given all the facts, that the purported compensation
payments necesarily contained a distribution of corporate earn-
ings within. 8
7
In the absence of goodwill, the dividend problem perhaps could
be avoided by carefully excluding tangible assets from the professional
corporation. 8 However, incorporating with minimal assets might in-
vite a Roubik "sham corporation" attack. Furthermore, it is not likely
that the limited capital assets of most professional corporations would be
held to account for a significant flow of income. The crucial undeter-
mined issue is whether the courts will be willing to recognize good will
as a capital asset requiring a dividend.80 If they are, part of the salary
of almost any professional shareholder could be converted into a dividend
carrying with it adverse tax consequences.9" On this subject Mr. Worthy
has commented:
It might be said that any amounts paid by a professional
corporation to its employees are necessarily reasonable compen-
85. Eaton, Operation of a Professional Service Corporation, N.Y.U. 28TH INST.
ON F D. TAX. 1243, 1269 (1969).
86. 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
87. Id. at 1339-40. A similar result was reached in a Tax Court case, Barton-
Gillet Co., 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 750 (1970), affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1343 (4th
Cir. 1971). Like McCandless, a professional corporation was not involved.
88. Jones, supra note 34, at 127.
89. For a case that placed a value ($32,500) on the goodwill of a young doctor's
medical practice for purposes of ascertaining community property in a divorce suit, see
Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969). This case and other
aspects of good will as related to the professional corporation are discussed in Jones,
supra note 34, at 127-30.
90. See notes 89-90 and accompanying text infra.
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sation, since they represent amounts paid by clients for the em-
ployee's services, less overhead and operating expenses of the firm.
It might be determined, however, that a portion of the corporation's
income is due to good will. To the extent that this is so, it cannot
be said that the salaries of the professional employees of the corpo-
ration are reasonable per se merely because they are based on the
corporation's billings.91
Isolated from the return on capital problem, the "reasonableness"
of compensation would not appear to pose a great danger for the pro-
fessional corporation except where salaries are unusually large even by
professional standards. The Court of Claims in McCandless quoted
from an earlier decision by that court92 which summarized various tests
used as follows:
"The inquiry as to the reasonableness of compensation in a
given instance is not without some guides. At various times
courts have looked to such things as the amounts paid by similar
enterprises for services of a like character; the type and extent of
services rendered by the employee; the scarcity of qualified em-
ployees for the position; the prior earning capacity of the employee;
the peculiar characteristics of the taxpayer's business, and the
general economic conditions of the period."93
Such guidelines would not seem to pose any particular problem for the
professional ordinarily. The test for reasonableness prescribed by the
Regulations (the first test in McCandless) is what 'would ordinarily be
paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances,"94
and since the professional can often refer to years of like compensation
for his services prior to incorporation or can refer to comparable com-
pensation on the part of individual practitioners, he would appear to
meet this test. Note that any amounts contributed to a qualified pen-
sion or profit sharing plan95 will be considered as compensation in decid-
ing what is reasonable.9"
One method of compensation commonly used in the professional
corporation may be particularly susceptible to attack both under the re-
turn on capital and unreasonable compensation theories-the year-end
bonus. In Nor-Cal Adjusters97 (not a professional corporation case)
91. Worthy, supra note 33, at 91.
92. Irby Constr. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824, 826 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
93. 422 F.2d at 1337-38. For other tests applied see Horsley & Dray, Compen-
sating officer-stockholders of professional corporations: An analysis, 34 J. TAx. 146, 147
(1971).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (1958).
95. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(b) (1960).
97. 40 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 875 (1971).
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the Tax Court, noting that "[pirudent businessmen will not long pursue
an endeavor which yields no return on invested capital,"' 8 found that
13,000 dollars in bonuses paid by the corporation, out of a total of
70,000 dollars in compensation, represented dividends. The facts that
bonuses were paid only to officer-shareholders and in direct proportion to
their shares, that payment appeared to be dependent on the availability
of profits, and that no dividend had ever been declared were all con-
sidered by the court.
One writer counsels:
[Ilt would certainly seem wiser to establish basic salaries for pro-
fessional employees at a level which can be fairly met during the
year and to play down the bonus aspects of their compensa-
tion. . . . [S]uch payments offer much greater exposure to the
Service's attack in this area.99
However, the bonus may be a "key ingredient" in making the compen-
sation plan for a professional corporation work,100 and avoidance of
the bonus may not be easy.
The tax consequences of a judicial determination that part of one's
salary represents a dividend are threefold. First, the dividend is sub-
ject to double taxation because the corporation is not allowed a deduc-
tion and the shareholder takes the "dividend" into ordinary income.
Secondly, the employee's salary is reduced by the amount of the dividend
with a pro rata reduction in the tax-deductible contribution the corpora-
tion can make on his behalf to a qualified pension or profit plan, since
this is usually based on a percentage of the employee's salary.' 0' A
third consequence is that the amount of the "dividend" is not subject to
the fifty percent tax limit on "earned income" imposed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 for income earned after 1971 and could be taxed
at a higher rate. 102
One way of minimizing the possibility of an IRS attack on pro-
fessional compensation as a disguised dividend is to declare at least a
nominal dividend annually'03 to counter the McCandless and Nor-Cal
types of attack.104 Other suggestions include use of detailed employ-
98. Id. at 881.
99. Horsley & Dray, supra note 81, at 148.
100. Eaton, supra note 74, at 1266-67.
101. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 404.
102. Id. § 1348.
103. Horsley & Dray, supra note 81, at 149; Lamon, Professional Corporations
Update: An Overview, in PLI HANDBOOi 19, 27; Zirkel & Beck, Professional Corpora-
tions: Another Turbulent Year, in PLI HANDBOOK 33, 40.
104. See notes 75-86 and accompanying text supra.
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ment contracts and corporate minutes documenting the compensation
awarded and payment of salaries in amounts disproportionate to stock-
holdings.'
0 5
Of less significance is a device often used in employment contracts
for executives aimed at the reasonable compensation problem-a reim-
bursement agreement 06 whereby the executive must repay to the cor-
poration any portion of his salary found to be unreasonable. Such an
agreement at least avoids double taxation and may act as a deterrent
to the IRS.
ALLOCATION OF INCOME UNDER SECTION 482
The most serious problem of all may be whether the Com-
missioner can successfully attribute the income of the organization
to the professional persons employed by it upon the theory that they
have simply assigned to the organization income which they have
personally earned.10
7
The doctrine of assignment of income has a long history dating back
to Lucas v. Earl,08 which proscribed arrangements "by which the fruits
are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."' 0 9 In
a recent case involving the issue of deflection of income, however, the
Second Circuit shifted its focus away from common-law doctrines. In
Rubin v. Commissioner"0 the appellate court reversed the Tax Court
for relying on "'common law' doctrines of taxation and the broad sweep
of Code § 61" where a statutory provision superior to such a "blunt tool"
exists."' The court was referring to section 482, which, among other
things, empowers the Commissioner to allocate income among two or
more trades or businesses if such allocation is necessary to prevent eva-
sion of taxes or clearly to reflect income.
How could a provision relating to multiple controlled entities be
applicable to a unitary professional corporation? First, two entities may
exist if the old partnership was continued in existence for some reason
(for example, to collect accounts receivable or pay accounts payable).
More importantly, the Commissioner may argue that the individual pro-
105. Horsley & Dray, supra note 81, at 149.
106. Id. at 148; Logan, Professional Corporations-A Current Look, 40 KA.
B.A.L 7, 61 (1971).
107. B. Eaton § 6.05[1], at 6-26.
108. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
109. Id. at 115.
110. 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970).
111. Id. at 653.
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fessional is himself engaged in an independent trade or business. Mr.
Worthy has indicated "in certain cases, particularly those involving in-
corporation of a one man practice, it may be possible that professional
income could be attributed under section 482 directly to the person
whose services produced it.""1
2
The Commissioner was successful in establishing a shareholder
"employee" as being engaged in a separate trade or business in a case
involving a personal service corporation, Borge v. Commissioner."8
In Borge the taxpayer contracted his personal services to his wholly
owned corporation to offset losses from a poultry farm run by the
corporation. The corporation received large fees for Borge's entertain-
ment services but paid out only a small percentage of such income as
salary to Borge. In some years Borge received nothing at all from the
corporation. The corporation had no management or administrative
responsibility with respect to Borge's bookings or activities. The court
found that "employee" Borge was in a separate trade or business, the
entertainment business, and allocated part of the entertainment income
that had flowed into the corporation directly to Borge.
In the Rubin case discussed above, the Tax Court on remand from
the Second Circuit"14 relied on Borge in rejecting the shareholder's argu-
ment that the Commissioner was attempting an allocation between a
corporation and its employee rather than between two separate controlled
entities:
We rely on Borge for the proposition that assignment-of-
income principles may be employed to the limited extent of sup-
porting the existence of a trade or business on the part of a share-
holder who purportedly acts as a corporate employee in conducting
his business affairs. 115
The focal point of the Borge and Rubin cases seems to be on the
employment relationship. In both cases the corporation served more
as a channel for funds derived from the taxpayer's personal services
than as a bona fide employer controlling the activities of the taxpayer.
The door was therefore open for a finding that an independent trade or
business existed.
With respect to professional corporations, every step should be
taken to confirm the professional as an employee and not "a shareholder
112. Worthy, supra note 33, at 90.
113. 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968).
114. Richard Rubin, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), ajl'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
115. Id. at 1162.
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who purportedly acts as a corporate employee in conducting his business
affairs." A few precautions, similar to those suggested to avoid the
"sham" corporation attack of Roubik, have been proposed to protect
against the threat posed by section 482:
1. Rigidly adhere to corporate formalities in terms of direc-
tors' and shareholders' meetings, record keeping including minutes,
etc.;
2. Be certain to conduct all business in the name of the cor-
poration and not the individual professionals;
3. Use a written employment agreement for all professionals
especially shareholder-officers;
4. Provide in the employment agreement that the profes-
sional is under the direction and control of the corporation and,
if applicable, that he will devote substantially all of his time to the
corporation; and
5. Where an individual professional is party to a contract
for personal services outside of his corporation, e.g., a doctor as
part-time employee of a hospital, be sure the arrangement is ac-
knowledged in the corporate papers consistently with the actual
facts.116
The consequence of a section 482 allocation in a professional cor-
poration context would be to take the amount of the allocation out of
the employee's salary base for purposes of corporate contributions to a
qualified plan. "Whe corporation would in effect be bypassed as a tax-
able entity, at least to the extent of income attributable to the services
of the individual shareholder." 117 The professional in effect would stand
to lose (in proportion to the allocation) the tax benefits that may have
provided the incentive to incorporate. The allocation would also disrupt
the operation of the corporation's qualified plan and would probably
cause the corporation to lose its deduction for part of its contribution to
the plan that year for the professional whose income was allocated."
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS
"[G]enerally speaking, earnings should be allowed to accumulate
in a [professional] corporation only if it is unlikely that the shareholders
will need to withdraw those funds before their death."1 19  This is so
because the net after-tax income remaining after payment of a corporate
116. Zirkle & Beck, supra note 91, at 43.
117. Worthy, supra note 33, at 90.
118. Horsley & Dray, supra note 81, at 146.
119. B. EATON, § 2.03[41, at 2-15.
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tax followed by a second tax to the shareholders upon withdrawal (even
though at capital gain rates) will roughly equal the net after-tax income
the shareholders would have received had they taken the money out in
the form of salary (unless the income of the employee shareholders is
substantially above 100,000 dollars-see table below). Postponement
of the tax is more than offset by the loss of the use of the money by the
shareholders and the uncertainty as to whether they can withdraw
amounts accumulated at capital gain rates when needed. Compare the
net after-tax amounts for the following selected income levels received
by a sole shareholder employee as salary on the one hand and as corpor-
ate income accumulated and later withdrawn at capital gain rates on the
other.1
20
Corporate Income Paid Corporate Income Accumu-
Out as Salary: Net lated: Net after Corpo-
after Individual Tax rate Tax Plus Individual
Taxable Income on Compensation Capital Gains Tax




The avenues by which the shareholders can receive capital gains
treatment for withdrawal of accumulated income during their lifetime
are limited (e.g., redemption of all a shareholder's stock, complete or
partial liquidation of the corporation, and sale of a shareholder's stock).
If a later distribution of accumulated earnings is made in the form of
dividends taxable as ordinary income (or is classified as a dividend by
the Commissioner) then accumulation by the corporation is highly
unfavorable.
121
If the shareholders hold their stock until death, however, the
second tax is avoided and accumulation works to their advantage. A
shareholder's stock is included in his gross estate and receives a stepped-
up basis equal to the estate tax valuation of its fair market value.
122
When the stock is redeemed by the corporation or purchased by other
shareholders as required by most state professional statutes, no gain is
120. These comparisons are adapted from id. § 2.03, Tables 3 and 4. "This analy-
sis has been based on 1969 Tax rates, ignoring the 'temporary' surtax, the future 50
percent maximum rate on earned income, and the possibility of a capital gain rate
higher than 25 percent." Id. at 2-14. Both the 50% maximum rate on earned income
under § 1348, which is now in effect, and a capital gains rate higher than 25% would
make accumulation of earnings even less attractive where applicable.
121. B. BrrxnR & J. EusT=cE, supra note 63, § 1.03 at 1-9.
122. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1014(a). A caveat is in order here, however, as
a capital gains tax on appreciated property is one of many revisions of estate taxation
currently under consideration. B. FATON § 2.03[5], at 2-16.
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realized if the purchase price equals the new stepped-up basis. Thus,
where the shareholders hold their stock until death, accumulation of
earnings is advantageous because it limits taxation of the earnings ac-
cumulated to the single corporate tax.
For this and other reasons 2 ' a professional corporation may de-
cide to accumulate earnings. To prevent unreasonable accumulation
of earnings as a means of circumventing double taxation, Congress
passed Code provisions to thwart "corporations improperly accumulat-
ing surplus."' 24 These sections impose a penalty tax of 27 1/2 percent
to 38 1/2 percent on accumulated earnings in excess of 100,000 dol-
lars' 2 5 for which a reasonable business need cannot be shown."2" These
accumulated earnings, of course, have already been taxed at normal
corporate rates. The rationale behind these sections is that accumulated
earnings not satisfying a business need are being held to avoid the tax
consequences of distributing earnings and profits in the form of dividends
to shareholders. The test for reasonableness is whether the accumula-
tion exceeds the amount that "a prudent businessman would consider
appropriate for the present business purposes and for the reasonably
anticipated future needs of the business.' 27  Total earnings and profits
accumulated over the years by the corporation are not subject to attack,
only accumulated income of the current year and "of each remaining
'open' year (i.e. usually those not barred by the three-year statute of lim-
itations) 128 is vulnerable.
Business justifications might include acquiring or constructing of-
123. A number of other considerations may cause accumulation of earnings. For
example, the corporation might pay the premiums on an insurance policy to fund a
buy-sell agreement. These payments are not deductible as an expense, and conse-
quently, the amount of the premiums each year would represent accumulated earnings
to the corporation. The advantages of using corporate dollars taxed at 22% (assuming
that no more than $25,000 is earned each year) instead of funding such policies out
of shareholders' after-tax dollars may well dictate this accumulation of earnings. (But
see problems with accumulations of over $100,000 for this purpose, discussed in notes
119-22 and accompanying text infra.)
124. INT. RFv. CoDE OF 1954 §§ 531-37.
125. INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954 § 531.
126. The language of § 532 appears to limit the penalty tax to corporations
"formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax" but § 533 (a) stipu-
lates that "the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative of the
purpose to avoid the income tax ...unless the corporation by the preponderance of
the evidence shall prove to the contrary." In short, the purpose of tax avoidance is
deemed to exist unless the corporation meets the burden of proving a reasonable busi-
ness need.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(a) (1959).
128. B. EATON, § 6.07[l], at 6-42.1 to 2.2 citing INTxNA Rfv~lir CODE Q0V
1954 §§ 535, 6501(a).
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fice space, purchasing equipment, expanding working capital, paying
indebtedness, or purchasing "key man ' 120 insurance.8 0  Section 537,
which is headed "Reasonable Needs of the Business," was amended in
1969 to allow the accumulation of earnings for purposes of making a
section 303 redemption of a deceased shareholder's stock to provide
assets from which to pay death taxes and funeral and administrative
expenses of the shareholder. 8 ' However, this accumulation can be
made only in "the taxable year of the corporation in which a shareholder
of the corporation died or any taxable year thereafter."''8 2  A strong
argument exists that accumulations made prior to the death of a share-
holder to fund redemption or buy-sell agreements are reasonable in
light of the requirement of many state professional statutes that a share-
holder's stock be redeemed by the corporation within a specified time
upon death.' 38 However, this is still an area of uncertainty.3 4
A professional corporation is likely to have difficulty justifying
accumulations other than those discussed.' 85 Consequently, any pro-
fessional corporation that does decide to accumulate more than 100,000
dollars in earnings and profits should carefully document its reasons and
be prepared to prove that it is not for tax avoidance purposes but to
service reasonable business needs.
SECTION 269
If control of a corporation is acquired for the principal purpose
of evading or avoiding income taxes by securing a deduction, credit,
or other allowance that would not otherwise be enjoyed, then section 269
provides that the Commissioner may disallow such a tax benefit.
It could be contended with some forcefulness' 80 that almost every
professional corporation is formed' 37 to avoid income taxes through the
use of a qualified pension or profit plan. 8 However, it would be diffi-
129. "Key man" insurance is insurance to compensate a business for loss of an
employee central to its operation.
130. Eaton, The 531 penalty tax and Subchapter S: Applying them to professional
corporations, 34 J. TAx. 143 (1971).
131. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 906, 83 Stat. 487.
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(c)(1) (1972).
133. B. EATON § 6.07[1] at 643. An example of such a requirement is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55B-7(b) (Supp. 1971) which requires redemption within one year.
134. B. EATON § 6.07[], at 6-43; see cases cited id. n.134.
135. Id. at 6-43 to -44.
136. See id. § 6.03, at 6-12 to -17.
137. "Mhe mere formation of a new corporation is an 'acquisition' within the
scope of Section 269." Id. at 6-10; see authorities cited id. n.25.
138. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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cult to condemn incorporation for the purpose of establishing a retire-
ment program specifically provided for in the Code, nothwithstanding
the fact that avoidance of taxes might be the principal purpose. Mr.
Worthy has intimated as much making reference to an analogous situa-
tion in which it was ruled that section 269 did not apply to corporations
formed to take advantage of tax benefits relating to Western Hemisphere
Trade Corporations.
1 3 9
However, it would be prudent to document in corporate records all
non-tax business purposes that led to professional incorporation.
PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY
The personal holding company sections of the Code present a po-
tentially disastrous trap for the small professional corporation, but
fortunately these provisions can be easily avoided. The purpose of these
sections is to prevent the deflection of personal income into a corpora-
tion to be taxed at a more favorable rate.
Section 541 of the Code taxes undistributed "personal holding com-
pany income" at a confiscatory 70 percent rate, which, if added to an
ordinary corporate tax rate of 48 percent on income in excess of 25,000
dollars, results in a tax of 84.4 percent! For a corporation to be labeled
a personal holding company as defined by section 542, more than fifty
percent in value of its outstanding stock must be owned by five or fewer
individuals and sixty percent or more of the corporation's adjusted gross
income must be classified as "personal holding company income."14 '
Section 543 outlines the various kinds of personal holding company
income (dividends, rents, royalties, etc.), but the type that most con-
cerns the professional corporation is the personal service contract. Two
key requirements exist in order to classify income from a personal
service contract as personal holding company income-some person
other than the corporation must have the right to designate the individ-
ual who is to perform the services, and the person so designated must
have owned twenty-five percent or more of the corporation's stock some-
time during the year. 14  The Commissioner's position is that a for-
mal designation in writing is not necessary and an oral agreement will
suffice.1 42 An agreement might even be implied. 4
139. Worthy, supra note 33, at 90, citing I.T. 3757, 1945 CuM. BULL. 200.
140. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 542(a).
141. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 543(a) (7).
142. Rev. Rul. 69-299, 1969-1 CuM. BLL. 165,
143. Reich, supra note 5, at 1216,
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Under these requirements, the personal holding company sections
should represent no real threat to the informed professional corpora-
tion for the following reasons. (1) It is not likely that sixty percent
of a professional corporation's adjusted gross income would come from
clients reserving the right to designate a specific practitioner to perform
the services. (Other personal holding company income, i.e., dividends,
rents, etc., must be considered also, however.)1 44 (2) If more than fifty
percent of the value of the stock owned is owned by more than five
shareholders the corporation is safe; however, death or retirement of a
shareholder followed by redemption of his shares can quickly alter the
situation. Furthermore, broad attribution rules for determining stock
ownership under section 544 may affect the determination of whether
fifty percent of the stock is owned by five or fewer individuals. (3) The
corporation can probably eliminate the personal holding company prob-
lem by having its clients sign a written contract indicating that only the
corporation has the right to designate the individual employee who is to
render the services. (4) A final saving provision exists in that the
personal holding company tax applies only to undistributed personal
holding company income.145 If the professional corporation pays out
all of its income each year, it is in no danger.
The most likely candidate for attack under the personal holding
company sections is the one-man professional corporation. Obviously
he is effectively designated to perform personal services by all of his
clients, and thus all of his income might be classified as personal holding
company income. The IRS could convincingly argue that there is an
implied oral personal service contract even if the client signs a written
contract reserving to the corporation the right to designate the individual
who renders the services.' 46 However, if the corporation pays out all
of its income to the professional, then there is no undistributed personal
holding company income to be taxed, and even the one-man professional
corporation is safe from the personal holding company attack.
SUBCHAPTER S
In theory, one way a professional corporation could avoid many
144. A corporation with five shareholders in which no shareholder held more than
20% of the stock could not have personal holding company income from personal
services contracts because of the requirement that the individual designated to perform
the services must hold 25% or more of the corporation's stock.
145. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 541; Panel Discussion, Professional Corporations,
24 TAx LAWYER 223, 241 (1970).
146. Taylor, PHC penalty tax: Steps that corporations of professionals can take to
sidestep it, 34 J. TAx. 141, 142 (1971).
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of these corporate pitfalls would be to elect to be taxed as a Subchapter
S corporation 47 if it meets the special requirements of that section.148
Under Subchapter S, as in a partnership, each shareholder is taxed on
his portion of the company's profits whether distributed or not.
149
Since all proceeds (with one exception regarding capital gains) 8 0 are
taken into ordinary income by the shareholders,' 5' no corporate income
would be left to allocate under section 482, no earnings could be ac-
cumulated, and no personal holding company income could remain to
incur that tax. (Note that a disguised dividend attack subsumed under
reasonable compensation and the "sham" corporation attack would
still be possible; in fact the Roubik case 52 involved a Subchapter S
corporation.) However, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 sharply reduced
the attractiveness of the Subchapter S election for the professional cor-
poration. The 1969 Act imposed upon Subchapter S corporations lim-
itations'5 3 similar to those contained in the Keogh Plan' 84 -that is, the
maximum deduction such a corporation can take for contributions to a
qualified pension or profit sharing plan for its employees is now the
lesser of 2500 dollars or 10 percent of the employee's salary.'55
Consequently, whenever greater tax-free contributions represent the
major incentive to incorporate, the Subchapter S election, which also
has some other inherent disadvantages of its own,"' no longer remains




Some reservations exist as to the tax treatment of accounts re-
ceivable transferred from a taxpayer (primarily from cash basis taxpay-
ers) to a corporation.5 8  More certainty exists that such transactions
147. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1371-79.
148. The corporation may have no more than ten stockholders, may have only one
class of stock, must be a domestic corporation not a member of an affiliated group,
and each stockholder must be either an individual or a decedent's estate. (A non-resi-
dent alien cannot be a stockholder.) INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1371(a).
149. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1373(a).
150. Id. § 1375(a).
151. Id. § 1373(b).
152. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
153. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1379(b)(1).
154. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
155. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1379 would not impose the other disadvantages
of the Keogh Plan. Reich, supra note 5, at 1217.
156. See Eaton, supra note 74, at 1272-74.
157. Id. at 1274.
158. For full discussion see B. EATON §§ 12.05, 12.07; Lipoff, Organizing a Pro-
fessional Service Corporation, N.Y.U. 28T INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1223, 1230-35 (1969).
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are safe if made under section 351, which allows movement into the
corporate form without tax consequences under prescribed conditions.'"
Other problems that may produce adverse tax consequences may
arise for the professional corporation. Termination of a corporation
may run afoul of the rules governing collapsible corporations.'10
Ownership by shareholders of another corporation may lead to multiple
corporation problems.'"' "Thin" incorporation problems may arise. 102
All of these simply point to the fact that the professional corporation
must be aware of all the ramifications of its new corporate status and
be alert to avoid accompanying tax pitfalls.
SUMMAY
The Commissioner's concession that organization of professionals
incorporated under state law will generally be treated as corporations
for tax purposes basically ended the long struggle over the tax classifi-
cation of the professional corporation. The only qualification remain-
ing is that the corporation must be both organized and operated as a
corporation and cannot be a "sham."
Nevertheless, once corporate status is established, the Commissioner
is left with a formidable array of weapons developed in the traditional
corporate arena that can pose serious tax problems for the unwary
professional organization. Section 482 empowering the Commissioner
to allocate gross income among two or more controlled entities could
represent a threat if courts are willing to find that the individual pro-
fessional is engaged in an independent trade or business outside the
corporation or if the organization is one of multiple controlled interests.
The applicability of section 269 similarly empowering the Commissioner
to disallow tax benefits if a corporation is acquired for the principle
purpose of evading or avoiding income taxes seems less likely since
Congress could hardly mean to condemn the pursuit of tax opportuni-
ties it created itself in the form of qualified pension and profit sharing
plans.
A trap for the unwary is laid by Code section 357(c) for profes-
sionals who utilize the tax-free transfers authorized by section 351 to in-
corporate. If the liabilities attaching to property transferred under sec-
159. Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962), acquiesced in, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 5.
160. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 341; B. EATON § 6.07[7]; Bittker & Eustice,
Collapsible Corporations in a Nutshell, 22 TAx. L. REv. 127 (1967).
161. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1561-64; B. EATON § 6.07[6].
162. B. EATON § 10.04.
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tion 351 are greater than the adjusted basis of the property in the hands
of the transferor (the taxpayer), he is taxed on the difference under
section 357 (c).
The trap lies in the fact that accounts receivable have a zero basis
in the hands of a cash basis taxpayer without regard to the value of the
receivables (and most professionals are on a cash basis). Consequently,
the basis for property transferred by most professional groups not having
substantial assets that have not been depreciated will be low. At the
same time accounts payable transferred to the corporation are viewed
as liabilities and are added to any other liabilities passing to the corpora-
tion. Under section 357 (c), the low adjusted basis is subtracted from
the liabilities, and the difference is taxed as gain to the professional who
transferred the property.
The trap can be avoided by not transferring accounts payable to
the corporation and holding out enough cash and accounts receivable to
pay off the accounts payable as they come due. Professionals seeking
to incorporate in the Second Circuit have been relieved of the problem
by the court's decision in Bongiovanni holding that accounts payable
are not liabilities for purposes of section 357 (c).
If a professional corporation accumulates more than 100,000 dol-
lars in earings and profits it must be prepared to defend these additional
accumulations in the event of a challenge under section 531. Nor can
a small professional corporation (especially a one-man corporation) re-
main unaware of the personal holding company provisions since, though
easy to avoid, these sections could have disastrous consequences if ap-
plicable.
Although many of the above attacks can be nullified if the pro-
fessional corporation makes a Subchapter S election, the tax benefits of
that election were so circumscribed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969
that it may not represent a real option for many professional organiza-
tions.
In addition to these traditional avenues of attack, some recent
court decisions such as McCandless and Nor-Cal,0 3 which may or may
not represent trends, deserve consideration by the professional corpora-
tion. While compensation paid to the professional may meet the test
of reasonableness, the possibility exists that the court might character-
ize part of his compensation as a return on capital or good will. To
the extent of any such constructive dividend, the professional's income
163. See notes 75-86 and accompanying text supra.
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would be subjected to double taxation, the corporation's contributions
on his behalf to a qualified plan based on a percentage of his salary
would be disqualified pro tanto, and the resulting dividend income would
not be limited to the fifty percent ceiling on earned income imposed
by section 1348 of the Code. Further cases along this line could lead
cautious professional corporations to declare at least a nominal dividend
annually.
Beneath the surface of all these areas of potential vulnerability
there lingers the undercurrent of the Treasury's sentiments with respect
to the corporation as a form of professional organization. The question
that awaits an answer is whether there might develop a double standard
subtly imposing more stringent requirements upon the professional cor-
poration than upon other businesses utilizing the corporate form. It
would seem to behoove those professionals who incorporate to respect
scrupulously the corporate formalities and to keep a close eye on the
potential tax pitfalls of the professional corporation.
Charles Robin Britt
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